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DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS-VENDOR'S LIABILITY
The principle that one harmed by a defective product may
generally recover damages from the manufacturer of the product
is well settled in Louisiana.' Whether the same plaintiff can
recover damages from the vendor of the product is a question
with no certain answer.2 The purpose of this Note is to illustrate
the confused state of Louisiana law concerning the vendor's
liability for harm caused by a defective product.
Sale of Foodstuffs
Louisiana Civil Code Article 2545s limits the vendor's liabil-
ity for damages to cases where he knows of the defects in the
product and fails to disclose them. This obstacle to recovery
from the seller was first overcome in the food cases. In Mac-
Lehan v. Loft Candy Stores,4 the court allowed recovery from
a manufacturer-vendor of food. Using the articles on redhibi-
tion, the court said: "There is an implied warranty in every
sale. The vendor guarantees the vendee against the hidden
defects of the thing sold."r5 From this genesis, courts have used
the redhibition articles to allow recovery from fabricator-vendors
of foodstuffs harmful to consumers.6 Courts are aided in such
1. For recovery from manufacturer in tort, see Malone, Res Ipsa
Loquttur and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of the Louisiana Cases, 4
LA. L. Rav. 70 (1941); for recovery from manufacturer in warranty, see
Note, 13 LA. L. REV. 624 (1953) (author points out that the requirement of
privity in such actions is removed due to the "implied warranty"); Note,
26 LA. L. REv. 447 (1966).
2. The difference between a vendor and manufacturer should be kept
in mind:
Vendor: "One that offers goods for sale esp. habitually or as a means
of livelihood."
Manufacturer: "One who changes the form of a commodity or who
creates a new commodity."
WEBSTER, THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961).
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2545 (1870): "The seller, who knows the vice of
the thing he sells and omits to declare it, besides the restitution of the
price and repayment of the expenses, is answerable to the buyer in damages."
4. 172 So. 367 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937).
5. Id. at 369.
6. Comment, 22 LA. L. REV. 435 (1962); Deris v. Finest Foods, Inc., 198
So.2d 412 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967), where plaintiff recovered damages for
harm resulting from eating a banana split prepared and served by defendant
which contained particles of glass. The court cited Arnaud's Restaurant v.
Cotter, 212 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 915 (1955), where
it was said: "Under Louisiana law, the proprietor of a public eating place
who serves food fabricated by him and containing a foreign substance to
a paying guest for immediate consumption on the premises is under an
absolute liability for damages proximately resulting from the Impurity,
under the theory of an implied warranty of fitness." Id. at 887.
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findings by the jurisprudential rule that a manufacturer is pre-
sumed to know the defects of his product.1
Whether a vendor of foodstuffs, who is not also the fabri-
cator, will always be held liable is not at all clear. In Gilbert v.
John Gendusa Bakery, Inc.,s the court allowed recovery by a
young boy who bought pre-packaged doughnuts from defendant
which contained foreign matter that made him ill. However, in
McCauley v. Manda Brothers Provisions Co., 9 the court held
that a vendor of a pre-packaged barbecue sandwich did not
know of the defect in it that caused harm, and therefore allowed
no recovery from the seller.
In addition to "implied warranty," courts also have used
the mechanisms of tort law to find a seller of food liable, the
doctrines and jargon of negligence having been used extensively
to allow recovery. 0 Some courts have even implied strict liability
of the vendor of foodstuffs though couching the decisions in terms
of negligence."
7. See Doyle v. Fuerst & Kraemer, Ltd., 129 La. 838, 840, 56 So. 906, 907
(1911): "The principle which governs in this case is that every one ought
to know the qualities, good or bad, of the things which he fabricates
in the exercise of the art, craft, or business of which he makes public
profession, and that lack of such knowledge is imputed to him as a fault,
which makes him liable to the purchasers of his fabrications for the
damage resulting from the vices or defects thereof." See also LeBlanc v.
Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So.2d 873 (1952); Tuminello
v. Mawbry, 220 La. 733, 57 So.2d 666 (1952); Givens v. Baton Rouge Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 182 So.2d 532 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); Reine v. Baton Rouge
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 126 So.2d 635 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961); Morrow v.
Bunkie Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 84 So.2d 851 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956); Com-
ment, 22 LA. L. REv. 535, 537 (1962); Note, 13 LA. L. REV. 624, 627 (1953).
8. 144 So.2d 760 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
9. 202 So.2d 492 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967): "[11n the absence of negligence
or knowledge of the defect or unwholesomeness of the product sold, a
retailer of a pre-packaged food product, which is not the manufacturer
thereof, sold for public consumption, cannot be held liable for injuries
resulting from the consumption thereof.
"We are aware that strict liability has been imposed on retailers in a
situation such as this in a great many jurisdictions. See William L.
Prosser, 'The Fall of the Citadel,' 50 Minnesota Law Review 791. However,
in this state, under our civil law regime, we are bound by the legislative
provisions relative to such matters." Id. at 497.
10. See Ortego v. Nehi Bottlings Works, 199 La. 599, 6 So.2d 677 (1942);
Bonura v. Barq's Beverages of Baton Rouge, 135 So.2d 338 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1961); Auzenne v. Gulf Public Service Co., 181 So. 54 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1938); Lee v. Smith, 168 So. 727 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936); notes 1 and 6
supra; Note, 26 LA. L. REV. 447 (1966).
11. See Lee v. Smith, 168 So. 727, 729 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936): "There
can be no doubt about the strict duty which the law imposes on those
engaged in preparing and selling food for human consumption to the
public . . ."; Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 137 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963): "[I]n Louisiana a manufacturer of
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Sale of Other Products
Any trend in the vendor's liability for sale of products other
than food is even harder to discern in the Louisiana jurispru-
dence. Courts in other states began by using the same approach
as in the food cases, 12 first to products intended for intimate
bodily use, and then to highly dangerous products. In some
jurisdictions, any product sold renders the seller strictly liable
if the product causes harm.'3
The Civil Code redhibition articles,14 requiring vendor's
knowledge of the defect, have presented the biggest hurdle in
Louisiana to recovery by those harmed by defective products.
Because it is extremely difficult to impute knowledge of the
defect to the vendor, plaintiffs have relied on tort theories to
recover from the seller. Even this method has proved arduous
because of plaintiff's problem sustaining the burden of proof.
There are indications, however, that the trend in this state is
changing.
In cases involving highly dangerous products, Louisiana
courts have used tort-negligence language to find a manufac-
turer-vendor liable for damage caused by the product. In Hake V.
Air Reduction Sales Co.,'3 the manufacturer-seller of an acety-
lene gas cylinder was found liable for damages from fire caused
by a defect in the cylinder. The basis for recovery was framed
in terms of res ipsa loquitur. In Home Gas & Fuel Co. v. Missis-
sippi Tank Co.,' 6 only contributory negligence prevented the
plaintiff from recovering from the manufacturer-vendor who
was shown to be negligent.
The inception of a trend allowing recovery in Louisiana
from the seller of products not inherently dangerous can be
food and cigarettes Is strictly liable for foreseeable harm resulting from a
defective condition in the product when the consumer uses the product for
the purposes for which it was manufactured and marketed." Id. at 39;
Gilbert v. John Gendusa Bakery, Inc., 144 So.2d 760 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962).
12. See notes 4-7 supra and accompanying text.
13. For an excellent study, see Prosser, The Fall o the Citadel, 50
MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
14. LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 2531 (1870): "The seller who knew not the vices
of the thing, is only bound to restore the price, and to reimburse the
expenses occasioned by the sale, as well as those incurred for the preserva-
tion of the thing, unless the fruits, which the purchaser has drawn from
it, be sufficient to satisfy the expenses." See also id. art. 2545; note 3 supra.
15. 210 La. 810, 28 So.2d 441 (1946).
16. 246 La. 625, 166 So.2d 252 (1964).
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inferred from Nettles v. Forbes Motel, Inc.17 There an assembler-
retailer of a dressing stool was found liable in tort for damages to
plaintiff injured when the stool collapsed while she was stand-
ing on it. This type of case is analogous to the fabricator-vendor
of foodstuffs, although "implied warranty" was not mentioned
as it has been in the food cases. Despite the tort negligence
language in these cases, Professor Malone points out that the
courts are actually using various cich6s to hold the manufac-
turer-vendor strictly liable.'8
Recent Developments
The recent case of Penn v. Inferno Mfg. Corp.19 exemplifies
the perplexities of the problem.20 There plaintiff was injured
by the explosion of defective glass in a high-pressure gauge,
which, although not manufactured by Inferno, carried the In-
ferno label as a part of gauges which were built by Inferno.
Plaintiff timely sued Inferno, thinking it was the manufacturer
of the glass, and later, more than a year after the accident,
sued the true manufacturer upon learning the true facts. With-
out the prescriptive provisions of Civil Code Articles 3536 and
2546,21 plaintiff undoubtedly had a cause of action against the
manufacturer, either on the theory of manufacturer's warranty
or in tort.22 Since Inferno was only a vendor, however, the court,
to grant recovery, had either to impute knowledge of the defect
to it, find it negligent in selling a defective product, or find it
strictly liable. Plaintiff gave the First Circuit ample theories
on which to ground its opinion. Unfortunately, the court adopted
plaintiff's brief without designating which theory it favored.
17. 182 So.2d 572 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966). See also Larance v. FMC
Corp., 192 So.2d 628 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966), where seller was held liable in
solido with manufacturer for being derelict in his duty to disseminate
instructions that, if used in full strength, product would cause harm.
18. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959 Term-
Torts, 20 LA. L. Rev. 245 (1960); Id. for the 1952-1953 Term, 14 LA. L. REV.
182 (1953); Id. for the 1949-1950 Term, 11 LA. L. REV. 186 (1951); Id. for the
1946-1947 Term, 8 LA. L. REv. 248 (1948); Id. for the 1945-1946 Term, 7 LA.
L. Rev. 246 (1947).
19. 199 So.2d 210 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 202 So.2d 649
(1967).
20. On the prescription issue the court held that prescription running
against a tortfeasor who is not sued within one year is interrupted when
a co-tortfeasor who is solidarily liable with him has been timely sued.
21. For action in tort: LA. CIVIL CODS art. 3536 (1870): "The following
actions are also prescribed by one year: That . . . resulting from offenses
or quasi offenses."
For action in redhibition: Id. art. 2546: "In this case, the action for
redhibition may be commenced at any time, provided a year has not elapsed
since the discovery of the vice."
22. See note 1 supra.
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Plaintiff apparently relied on three main theories. He first
contended that Inferno labeled the glasses as its own, thus
holding itself out as manfacturer. Second, Inferno was a dealer
in the goods, represented itself as manufacturer, and thus should
have had knowledge of the defects imputed to it. 23 Third,
Inferno supplied the molds in which the glasses were made,
thus aiding in the manufacturing process and should have known
of the defects, by virtue of the Louisiana doctrine of imputing
knowledge of defects to the manufacturer. Perhaps because none
of these theories had clear-cut precedents in Louisiana law, the
court did not say which was most convincing. No doubt the
public policy argument that the law should not encourage the
mislabeling of products was as strong as any of the arguments
based on warranty or negligence. Yet, courts are very reluctant
to admit rendering decisions on such a basis.
Not willing to accept any theory offered by plaintiff, the
dissent based its strongest objection to the majority ruling on
the code provisions allowing only recovery of price and ex-
penses of the sale from an unknowing vendor. It cited the cases
of Boyd v. J. C. Penney Co.24 and Hurley v. J. C. Penney Co.25
where plaintiffs were denied recovery on the basis of lack of
knowledge of the defects by the vendor.
Both the majority and dissent rationales have their followers
in Louisiana. Yet, Penn is the only Louisiana case found in
which a vendor, who was not also a manufacturer or assembler
of a product other than food, was held liable for damages result-
ing from the sale. It can be inferred that there may be a trend
developing that will allow a plaintiff to recover from a non-
manufacturer/assembler-vendor. This suggestion is predicated
on the Penn case and dictum in Meche v. Farmer Drier &
Storage Co.26 stating that the "manufacturer or seller of a product
23. Plaintiff cited 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 100(3), at 1106 (1966) and sev-
eral cases from common law jurisdictions as his authority for his first two
contentions.
24. 195 So. 87 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940). Plaintiff bought dress from
defendant which had Penney's trademark on it. Toxic material in dress
caused serious rash on plaintiff.
25. 140 So.2d 445 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962). Defective lawnmower caused
injury to plaintiff who sought recovery from defendant since Penney pub-
lished an instructions manual which it sold with machines.
26. 193 So.2d 807, 811 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967). The court cited Smith v.
New Orleans & Northeastern R.R., 153 So.2d 533, 539 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1963): "'The duty of the maker or vendor of an article harmless in kind,
but dangerous through defect, has been said to be in general a negative
duty, that is, not knowingly so to dispose of the article that it may become
a trap to the innocent .... '"
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which involves a risk of injury to the user is liable to any
person, who without fault on his part, sustains an injury
caused by a defect in the design or manufacture of the article,
if the injury might have been reasonably anticipated."
Nevertheless, except in cases of fabricator-vendors of food-
stuffs, there is no clear picture in Louisiana as to when the
vendor will be held liable for damages caused by a defective
product.
Conclusion
It is submitted that the courts or the legislature should adopt
a workable rule that will guide vendors in protecting them-
selves. A start in that direction would be to hold any vendor
liable who represents himself as the manufacturer of a product
which, if defective, involves an unreasonable risk of harm
when used for the foreseeable purpose for which it was intended
by a consumer. This rule should apply whether or not the vendor
had a part in the manufacturing process. Penn can be inter-
preted to establish this rule. Yet, a more explicit and definitive
holding on which to base the standard would be desirable.
John M. Madison, Jr.
THE EFFECT OF A DECLARATION OF HoMEsTEAD ON A
PRE-EXISTING ORDINARY DET
Article XI of the Louisiana Constitution exempts from sale
and seizure "the homestead, bona fide, owned by the debtor and
occupied by him" consisting of lands and other property to the
total value of not more than $4,000.00.1 It also provides that the
exemption exists, without registration, except in cities having
a population of more than 250,000.2
1. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1, as amended, La. Acts 1932, No. 142, adopted
Nov. 8, 1932; La. Acts 1938, No. 42, adopted Nov. 8, 1938, provides in part:
"There shall -be exempt from seizure and sale by any process whatever,
except as hereinafter provided, the homestead, bona fide, owned by the
debtor and occupied by him, consisting of lands, not exceeding one hundred
and sixty (160) acres . . . whether rural or urban, of every head of family,
or person having . . . a person or persons dependent on him . . . for sup-
port; . . . to the total value of not more than Four Thousand Dollars
($4,000.00)."
2. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 4, as amended, La. Acts 1938, No. 42, adopted Nov.
8, 1938; La. Acts 1952, No. 101, adopted Nov. 4, 1952, provides: "The home-
stead exemptions herein provided shall exist without registration except
1968]
